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FUNDAMENTALIST CHALLENGES TO CORE DEMOCRATIC
VALUES: EXIT AND HOMESCHOOLING
Catherine J. Ross*
This Essay explores the choice many traditionalist Christian parents (both
fundamentalist and evangelical) make to leave public schools in order to teach their
children at home, thus in most instances escaping meaningful oversight.  I am not pri-
marily concerned here with the quality of academic achievement in the core curric-
ular areas among homeschoolers, which has been the subject of much heated debate.1 
Instead, my comments focus on civic education in the broadest sense, which I define
primarily as exposure to the constitutional norm of tolerance.  I shall argue that the
growing reliance on homeschooling comes into direct conflict with assuring that
children are exposed to such constitutional values.
I begin with a brief social and legal history of homeschooling in the United States
during the twentieth century and then discuss the dominance of religiously moti-
vated parents among homeschoolers in contemporary America.  Section II shows
that homeschoolers make broad claims for exemption from state oversight that are
not warranted by the constitutional doctrine on which they rely.  In Section III, I argue
that the state’s interest in educating children for life in a pluralist democracy trumps
any asserted parental liberty interest in controlling their children’s education.  Finally,
in Section IV, I argue that where parents do not live together and share legal custody
of their children, the state should articulate a preference for formal schooling over
* Yale University, B.A., Ph.D. (History), J.D.; Professor of Law, The George Washington
University Law School. The Author thanks the Institute for Advanced Study, where she was
a member of the School of Social Science during 2008–2009, and Dean Frederick Lawrence
of The George Washington University Law School for research support.
1 Much controversy surrounds the educational attainments of homeschooled children.
See, e.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko, Education Off the Grid: Constitutional Constraints on
Homeschooling, 96 CAL. L. REV. 123, 134 & nn.47–50, 180 (2008) (arguing, among other
things, that all children should be required to attend organized public or private schools until
they have mastered the educational basics at the level required under each state’s constitution).
The authors of one recent article argue that parents have a constitutional right to homeschool
regardless of their own educational credentials, and maintain that homeschooled children score
well on academic achievement tests, and that additional state regulation does not improve
the quality of education as measured by traditional tests. Tanya K. Dumas et al., Evidence
for Homeschooling: Constitutional Analysis in Light of Social Science Research, WIDENER
L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1317439) (citing
numerous studies); see also Brief for Home Sch. Legal Def. Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioners, Jonathan L. v. Super. Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008)
(No. B192878) (reviewing homeschooling academic successes). This Article does not respond
to their claims.
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homeschooling when the parents disagree.  I urge states to engage in far more strin-
gent oversight and regulation of homeschooling than exists in any state at present,
arguing that there is no constitutional bar to doing so and a compelling state interest
in additional oversight tools, especially in the arena of civic education concerning
normative democratic values about tolerance and diversity.
I. HOMESCHOOLING
A. A Brief Legal History
The rise of formal schools and the adoption of compulsory school laws trans-
formed schooling in nineteenth-century America.  Beginning in the second quarter
of the nineteenth century, the common school movement led by Horace Mann and
other reformers resulted in the widespread availability of free public schools.2  Home-
schooling virtually disappeared in the United States by the early twentieth century
as states (beginning with Massachusetts in 18523 and ending with Texas in 1915)4
adopted and enforced laws requiring parents to make their children literate and, later,
to send their children to a formal school for at least part of every academic year.5
The constitutionality of one brand of compulsory school law reached the United
States Supreme Court in 1925.  In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court overturned
a compulsory school law that parents could only satisfy by enrolling their children
in public schools, barring the use of sectarian or other private schools.6  The Court
held that parents must have the right to choose among approved ways of satisfying
the compulsory education law, but in doing so it underscored that the case did not
challenge “the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, super-
vise and examine them, their teachers and pupils; to require . . . that certain studies
plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing be taught which
is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.”7
The Court has never fleshed out the extent of the state’s power to regulate inde-
pendent schools.  Today, the vast majority of states impose curricular requirements on
private schools, and these requirements appear to be largely unchallenged.8  Similarly,
2 See Carl F. Kaestle, Victory of the Common School Movement: A Turning Point in
American Educational History, in HISTORIANS ON AMERICA 23, 26–27 (U.S. Dep’t of State
2007), available at http://www.america.gov/media/pdf/books/historians-on-america.pdf.
3 Act of May 18, 1852, ch. 240, 1852 Mass. Acts 170–71.
4 Act of Mar. 13, 1915, ch. 49, 1915 Tex. Gen. Laws 92.
5 See, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 529 (Mass.
1993) (describing the Massachusetts Colony requiring towns to open public schools beginning
in 1647).
6 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
7 Id. at 534.
8 Eric A. DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic Schools: Does the Tie Still Bind?,
2003 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 363, 393.
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the Court has never had an occasion to consider the reach of the state’s authority to
regulate homeschooling , which is completely unregulated in states such as Alaska,
and in other states subject to minimal requirements, ranging from mandatory notice
to the state that the parents intend to homeschool to reporting and testing requirements
regarding mastery of core curricular subjects such as reading and math.9  It stands
to reason, however, that if states can regulate licensed private schools, the educational
needs of children make it even more important for the state to provide minimum edu-
cational standards for children whose schooling takes place completely immune from
the view of strangers.
Homeschoolers nonetheless frequently rely on the language in Pierce regarding
parental rights for authority not only to teach their children at home, but also to do
so without any government oversight at all.10  These arguments almost always fail. 
State courts and lower federal courts have repeatedly rebuffed assertions by sectarian
schools and homeschoolers that they are constitutionally entitled to complete freedom
from state oversight.11
During the first half of the twentieth century, some state courts accepted defenses
to charges of violating the compulsory school laws that would not be credible today. 
When many people still lived in rural communities where transportation was limited,
some courts excused parents who taught their children at home when the distances
were too far and the town did not provide transportation or the travel conditions were
too dangerous due to isolated country roads.12  Even then, however, school authorities
were often unwilling to grant parents permission to teach their children at home where
statutes provided discretion to do so.13
9 See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 14.30.010 (2006); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8,
§ 100.10 (2010) (describing a comprehensive regulatory scheme including filing of home
instruction plans, quarterly reports and annual testing); see also Home School Legal Defense
Association State Laws, http://www.hslda.org/laws/ (last visited Apr. 13, 2010). HSLDA is
a Christian advocacy group that opposes state regulation of homeschooling, which provides
a guide to the law in each state. The guide, however, as shown below, does not always sum-
marize applicable law accurately.
10 Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“[T]he State [may not] standardize its children.”); see also
Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 247 (3d Cir. 2008) (rejecting parents’
reliance on Pierce and related cases Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
11 E.g., Combs, 540 F.3d at 247; People v. Turner, 263 P.2d 685, 686–87 (Cal. App.
Dep’t Super. Ct. 1953), appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1954). But see Brunelle v. Lynn
Pub. Sch., 702 N.E.2d 1182, 1186 (1998) (holding that mandatory home visits by state officials
violate parents’ rights, but other regulations are allowed).
12 See, e.g., In re Richards, 7 N.Y.S.2d 722, 723 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938) (noting that the
road to school was “lonely, poorly cared for, [and] unfenced”). But see People v. Himmanen,
178 N.Y.S. 282, 283 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1919) (holding that the only defense to compulsory atten-
dance is the physical or mental condition of the child and that bad roads and the lack of a school
bus are immaterial).
13 See, e.g., Care and Prot. of Charles, 504 N.E.2d 592, 594–95 (Mass. 1987).
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By the middle of the twentieth century homeschooling had virtually disappeared,
and its legal status was uncertain at best.  It is estimated that by mid-century no more
than 10,000 children satisfied the compulsory school laws by studying at home.14 
Homeschooling without authorization left parents vulnerable to charges of child
neglect because the state did not recognize homeschooling as a legitimate alternative
to public schools or organized private schools.15
Homeschooling experienced a gradual resurgence beginning in the 1960s, initially
as part of a progressive movement influenced by educational theorists who favored
unstructured learning.16  Starting in the late 1970s some state courts began to inter-
pret the compulsory education statutes to allow parents to homeschool if they pro-
vided their children with an education equivalent to the training offered in the public
schools.17  But as public schools adopted more progressive approaches to learning,
“conservative and religious families were surprised to find themselves in a counter-
cultural position” as they began to homeschool.18  Homeschooling remained illegal
in the majority of states in 1981.19  Court decisions, combined with effective lobbying
by Christian homeschoolers that prompted statutory reforms, led to a legal revolution
so that by 2000, homeschooling was legal under some circumstances in all fifty states,
whether by judicial decree or statute.20
The question of whether homeschooling parents have violated the compulsory
education laws often turns on whether the statutory language in the state’s compul-
sory education law provides a mechanism for an alternative to an organized, licensed
school.  Where it does not, some courts have allowed parents to claim that they run
a private school in the sense contemplated by the statute, even though the enrollment
of the school is limited to one or more family members and the school is located in
14 Patricia M. Lines, Homeschooling Comes of Age, 140 PUB. INT. 74, 75–76 (2000).
15 Id. at 77 (noting that early pioneers of contemporary homeschooling faced the risk of
fines or even jail); see, e.g., Turner, 263 P.2d at 689 (holding attendance at public or private
school or lessons at home from a licensed teacher are the only ways to satisfy compulsory
school laws); State v. Bowman, 653 P.2d 254, 258–59 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that
teaching by a parent or private tutor is not a private school under the compulsory education
law, but parents can homeschool at the state’s discretion); Grigg v. Commonwealth, 297 S.E.2d
799, 803 (Va. 1982) (declaring that unapproved homeschooling does not constitute a private
school). But see People v. Levisen, 90 N.E.2d 213, 215 (Ill. 1950) (holding that where a
statute does not provide an exemption from compulsory school requirement for lessons from
parent or tutor, the court will recognize quality homeschooling as a “private school”).
16 Lines, supra note 14, at 75–76.
17  Brunelle v. Lynn. Pub. Sch., 702 N.E.2d 1182, 1184–85 (Mass. 1998);  Perchemlides
v. Frizzle, No. 16641 (Mass. Super. Ct. Nov. 13, 1978) (mem.), available at http://www
.mhla.org/information/massdocuments/perchemlidesdecision.pdf.
18 Lines, supra note 14, at 76.
19 Yuracko, supra note 1, at 124 & n.2 (citing Home-Schooling: George Bush’s Secret
Army, ECONOMIST, Feb. 28, 2004, at 52).
20 See Lines, supra note 14, at 77.
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their home.21  But even today, homeschooling as generally defined—parents teaching
their own children at home—exposes parents to legal liability, shocking parents and
home school proponents.
For example, in September 2009 the Superintendent of Education for the State
of Alabama reiterated, “the only legal means of ‘homeschooling’ is by a private tutor
who is certified to teach in the public schools.”22  Apparently he circulated this formal
reminder because of widespread abuses of another option under state law—“enrollment
and attendance” at a church school operated under the oversight of a local church,
group of churches or denomination.23  According to the Home School Legal Defense
Association, the “vast majority” of Alabama homeschoolers enroll in church schools,
but do not attend any organized school.24  Instead, the church school treats each family
as a classroom.25  Alabama’s Superintendent made clear that going forward the state
would require attendance at an actual school run by a church before a child would
be deemed to be receiving the education the law requires.26
B. Who Homeschools and Why
It is hardly surprising that Alabama allows church schools that are not licensed
through the normal process applicable to independent schools to fulfill the compulsory
school requirement, at least if the children actually attend, because religious groups
have been the prime advocates for both homeschooling and independent schools.
Although many deeply religious, conservative Protestant families remain in public
schools, and frequently fight to reform them, “a significant minority of conservative
and evangelical Protestants have chosen some form of an exit strategy in favor of reli-
gious schools.”27  Religious belief has long motivated the vast majority of parents
who decline to enroll their children in public schools.  In the nineteenth century,
Roman Catholics set up a vast system of religious schools in response to rampant
Protestant proselytization in public schools.28  Some of the earliest court decisions
21 See, e.g., Jonathan L. v. Super. Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 590 (2008) (holding, among
other things, that the applicable statute treats home schools as private full-time day schools
thus exempting their students from the compulsory public education law); People v. Levisen,
90 N.E.2d 213, 215 (Ill. 1950) (quoting State v. Peterman, 70 N.E. 550, 551 (Ind. App. 1904)).
22 Home School Legal Defense Association, Controversy Over “Attendance” at Church
Schools, Oct. 28, 2009, http://www.hslda.org/hs/state/al/200910280.asp [hereinafter HSLDA,
Controversy]; see also ALA. CODE § 16-28-5 (2009).
23 HSLDA, Controversy, supra note 22; see also ALA. CODE § 16-28-1.
24 HSLDA, Controversy, supra note 22; see also ALA. CODE § 16-28-3.
25 HSLDA, Controversy, supra note 22.
26 See id.; ALA. CODE §§ 16-28-5, -1, -3.
27 David Sikkink, Conservative Protestants, Schooling, and Democracy, in 1 EVANGEL-
ICALS AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 276, 278 (Steven Brint & Jean Reith Schroedel eds.,
2009).
28 See STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A MULTI-
CULTURAL DEMOCRACY 74–75 (2000).
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about homeschooling involved parents who asserted that the public school’s prac-
tices undermined their own religious beliefs.29  Many religious homeschoolers keep
their children out of public schools expressly to shelter them from what the parents
see as a secular bias that undermines fundamentalist teachings.30
When parents choose not to enroll their children in public schools, the children
almost always end up receiving a sectarian education, whether in an organized,
licensed independent school or at home.  In 2005, nearly forty percent of all children
enrolled in non-public schools attended a Roman Catholic school, and that was a
significant decline from the 1960s.31  Another thirty-eight percent of children in
private school in 2005 attended “other religious” schools.32  Some of the “other
religious” schools expressly describe themselves as “evangelical.”33  Although it is
hard to measure the number of homeschooled children with any precision, most
estimates indicate that twice as many children are homeschooled as are enrolled in
conservative Christian schools.34
While it remains a sliver of the educational landscape, homeschooling is growing
rapidly.  In 2007, the most recent year for which data are available, about 1.5 million
children (or roughly 2.9% of school-aged children) were being homeschooled in the
United States.35  Some experts predict that homeschooling will grow at a rate as fast
as fifteen to twenty percent annually in some parts of the country.36
Proponents of homeschooling emphasize that parents from all walks of life home-
school and that they do so for many different reasons.  That is true as far as it goes. 
Homeschoolers live in every part of the country, include every race and religion, and
fall at various points along the socioeconomic spectrum.37  The vast majority of
29 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 126 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Mass. 1955) (affirming
conviction of Buddhists who kept their children from attending school because, among other
things, they objected to reading from the Bible, reciting the Lord’s prayer and similar
materials).
30 Rob Reich, The Civic Perils of Homeschooling, EDUC. LEADERSHIP, Apr. 2002, 56, 57.
31 THOMAS D. SNYDER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, DIGEST OF EDUC.
STATISTICS 2008, 91 tbl. 58 (U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 2009).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 287 tbl. 197.
34 ROB REICH, BRIDGING LIBERALISM AND MULTICULTURALISM IN AMERICAN EDUCATION
145 (2002). It is hard to measure the numbers of homeschooled children accurately because
some states, like Alaska, do not require homeschoolers to report the existence of their children,
while in states that do require reporting, some homeschoolers refuse to comply. Id.; see also
Home School Legal Defense Association, Home Schooling in the United States: A Legal
Analysis-Alaska, available at http://www.hslda.org/laws/analysis/Alaska.pdf.
35 NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, ISSUE BRIEF: 1.5 MILLION HOMESCHOOLED
STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2007, NCES 2009-030, 1 (U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 2008),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2009/2009030.pdf [hereinafter NCES, ISSUE BRIEF].
36 Lines, supra note 14, at 75.
37 Dumas et al., supra note 1, at 7–8; Lines, supra note 14, at 78.
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homeschoolers, however, are white and Christian,38 and they choose to homeschool
because of their religious beliefs and their desire to protect their children from con-
flicting messages.
Federal surveys taken in 2003 and 2008 by the National Center for Education
Statistics in the U.S. Department of Education clarify the depth of religious convic-
tion among homeschoolers.  In 2003, seventy-two percent of homeschooling parents
reported that one reason they teach their children at home is to provide “religious
instruction.”39  By 2007, eighty-three percent of homeschoolers reported that they
chose to keep their children at home to “provide religious or moral instruction.”40 
Although in 2003 only thirty percent of homeschoolers called religious instruction
their “primary” reason for teaching their children themselves,41 some other reasons
offered as “primary” may reduce to religion.  For example, homeschooling parents
cite their desire to protect their children from “negative peer pressure,” much as the
Amish parents in Yoder worried about the goings-on in high school.42  Muslims are
also increasingly turning to homeschooling to protect their children from drugs and
their daughters from “dressing like hoochies, cursing and swearing and showing dis-
respect toward their elders,” as well as to protect children from prejudice.43
Homeschoolers also voice “dissatisfaction with academic instruction” offered in
the public schools.44  We should interpret “dissatisfaction with academic instruction”
in light of other things that we know about the attitudes of conservative Christian home-
schoolers.  Michael Farris, a founder of the Home School Legal Defense Association,
has warned of the dangers of public education, which according to him include “pro-
moting values that are questionable or clearly wrong: the acceptability of homosexu-
ality as an alternative lifestyle; the acceptability of premarital sex as long as it is ‘safe’;
the acceptability of relativistic moral standards.”45  We can infer that many home-
schoolers’ concerns about instruction in the public schools likely include objections
to sex education, evolution, gender equality, and the choice of secular curricular
38 SNYDER ET AL., supra note 31, at 71 tbl. 38; Lines, supra note 14, at 78. But see Dumas
et al., supra note 1, at 8 (“[T]he homeschooling community is not a monolithic bloc.”).
39 DANIEL PRINCIOTTA ET AL., HOMESCHOOLING IN THE UNITED STATES: 2003, 13 tbl. 4
(U.S. Dep’t of Educ. 2006).
40 NCES, ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 35, at 2 fig.2.
41 PRINCIOTTA ET AL., supra note 39, at 13 tbl. 4.
42 Id. at 13–14 & n.2 (“including safety, drugs, [and] negative peer pressure”); see
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (describing the Amish objection to “social
life with other students,” with its attendant pressures to “conform to the styles, manners, and
ways of the peer group”).
43 Neil MacFarquhar, Resolute or Fearful, Many Muslims Turn to Home Schooling, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 26, 2008, at A14 (reporting that in Lodi, California, thirty-eight of the ninety
school-age girls of Southeast Asian origin are homeschooled).
44 NCES, ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 35, at 2; see PRINCIOTTA ET AL., supra note 39, at
13–14 & tbl. 4.
45 Yuracko, supra note 1, at 127 (quoting MICHAEL FARRIS, HOMESCHOOLING AND THE
LAW 59 (1990)).
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materials.46  As Rob Reich has pointed out, religious homeschoolers seek to give their
children “a proper religious education free from the damning influences of secularism
and pop culture” and they make no secret of that fact.47
All of these primary reasons for homeschooling—both those that are expressly
religious and those that resonate in a family’s conservative religious beliefs—indicate
that almost ninety percent of parents who homeschool do so for reasons stemming
from their religious beliefs.48  The survey data clearly confirm the anecdotal evidence
suggesting that homeschooling is dominated by conservative Christians.49
II. THE AUTONOMY CLAIMS OF HOMESCHOOLERS
A. Freedom from Oversight
Some homeschooling parents insist that education is none of the state’s business,
seeking freedom from the classical balance of powers between the state and the
family.  The Pennsylvania families that challenged the state’s authority to keep track
of homeschooled children in Combs v. Homer-Center School District,50 for example,
maintained that God gave the family “exclusive jurisdiction” over the education of
children.51  The parents asserted that the state’s requirement that they keep a log of
their homeschooling activities and turn that log over to the state for periodic review
was a form of compelled conduct and expression that violated their religious beliefs.52 
They believed it would be “sinful for them to . . . grant control over their children’s
education to the civil government.”53
46 These concerns echo those of litigants who have sought to protect their children from
exposure to ideas and language they found offensive, the most studied being Vicki Frost, who
lost her battle to protect her children from the Holt reading series. Mozert v. Hawkins County
Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1060, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988);
STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGROUND 11 (1993); see also Duro v. Dist. Attorney, 712 F.2d 96,
97 (4th Cir. 1983) (“Duro [a Pentacostalist homeschooler] . . . is opposed to what he terms the
‘unisex movement where you can’t tell the difference between boys and girls . . . .’”), cert.
denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984); MACEDO, supra note 28, at 159–60.
47 Reich, supra note 30, at 57.
48 NCES, ISSUE BRIEF, supra note 35, at 2, 3 & fig.2 (finding that eighty-eight percent
report “concern about the school environment” and eighty-three percent “desire to provide
religious or moral instruction”; only seven percent reported a desire to use a “nontraditional
approach to education”).
49 Deeply religious parents from other religious traditions, however, are increasingly
exploring homeschooling. MacFarquhar, supra note 43.
50 540 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
51 Id. at 234.
52 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
at 6–7, Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., No. 04-CV-1599 LEAD (Apr. 13, 2006).
53 Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 468 F. Supp. 2d 738, 754 (W.D. Pa. 2006), aff’d
in part and vacated in part, 540 F.3d 231 (2008).
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Similarly, a father of homeschooled children in California, who relied on Christian
curricular materials, referred to public schools as “‘a world of snitches.’”54  He feared
school attendance would expose the family (which had a long record with child wel-
fare authorities) to inappropriate prying by neighbors and state officials.55  It is a short
step from this dismissal of the parens patriae function in education to hiding from
child welfare workers as well as school officials (as indeed this family did).56  This
constellation of beliefs and resistance parallels, on a smaller scale, the interaction
between child welfare workers and the residents of the fundamentalist Latter-Day
Saints Yearning for Zion Ranch in Texas that may have helped to stoke the state’s
inappropriate and disproportionate response to an allegation of sexual abuse—an
incident I have discussed at length elsewhere.57
Homeschoolers who take this hard line stance starkly challenge a bulwark of the
modern state—that the state has an independent interest in the well-being of children
who will be the next generation of citizens.  Their position cannot be reconciled with
the philosophy of the modern state as summarized by the California Supreme Court
sitting en banc in 1984.58  The court concluded that the free school guarantee in the
state constitution “reflects the people’s judgment that a child’s public education is
too important to be left to the budgetary circumstances and decisions of individual
families.”59  The court relied in part on a concededly paternalistic speech representing
a different time and a different world view, in which one leader of California’s public
school movement, arguing for a right to education to be included in the state’s consti-
tution, opined in 1863 that “‘if left to their own unaided efforts, a great majority of
people will fail through want of means to properly educate their children; another class,
with means at command, will fail through want of interest.’”60 And, one might add, in
a more communal, and I hope less paternalistic, spirit through an agenda that expressly
conflicts with the shared message of the public schools, to which we now turn.
54 Jonathan L. v. Super. Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 594 n.33 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
55 Id.
56 Id. at 579 (finding that during a dependency proceeding, the family was “uncooperative,”
the mother “attempted to hide the children,” and then coached them “not to talk with the social
workers”).
57 Catherine J. Ross, Legal Constraints on Child-Saving: The Strange Case of the
Fundamentalist Latter-Day Saints at Yearning for Zion Ranch, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 361
(2008) (arguing that the state violated the parents’ substantive and procedural rights when
it removed nearly 470 children from the Ranch, and that following the law would have led
to a result that would have been less traumatic for the children and more productive for achiev-
ing the state’s legitimate goals). Analyzing that situation, I recommended that the children—or
at least the girls approaching physical maturity, the only ones about whom there appeared to
be cause for concern—should have been required to attend local public schools where they
would have contact with mandated child abuse reporters as well as the opportunity to learn
about other ways of life. Id. at 408–09.
58 Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35 (Cal. 1984) (en banc).
59 Id. at 43.
60 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting John Swett).
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B. Freedom from Conflicting Ideas
The education provided by traditionalist religious families at home may come
head to head with core values our educational system is designed to inculcate.  The
Court’s assertion in Pierce that the state may demand that all students receive in-
struction “plainly essential to good citizenship”61 should not be read as limited to the
three Rs.  Homeschooling parents, and others who object to the curricular choices
made by public school officials, often mistakenly believe that the parental rights rec-
ognized in the Pierce line of cases entitle them to protect their children from expo-
sure to ideas that conflict with the messages parents are inculcating at home.  But the
circuit courts that have reached the question have uniformly held that once parents
enroll their children in public school, their rights to restrict the curriculum to which
their children are exposed are extremely limited.62
Parents often object to the public school curriculum based on conflicts between
the curriculum and the parents’ religious beliefs, the most common cause of curric-
ular disputes that reach the courts.  In a widely-analyzed case—Mozert v. Hawkins
County Public Schools63—the Sixth Circuit held that mere “exposure” to ideas that
self-described “born again Christian” parents asserted were undermining their reli-
gious beliefs did not violate the free exercise rights of the parents.64
In particular, the parents objected to readings which taught religious tolerance
and critical thinking, both of which the parents thought conflicted with the families’
teachings in areas “where the Bible provides the answer.”65  One parent objected to
curricular materials “about women who have been recognized for achievements out-
side their homes,” as well as to readings that exposed his children to information about
“other forms of religion” and “the feelings, attitudes and values of other students”
when unaccompanied by “a statement that the other views are incorrect.”66  The
parents’ demands, the court held, conflict with the “civil tolerance” the Supreme
Court has included among the fundamental values “essential to a democratic society,”
which requires that “in a pluralistic society we must ‘live and let live.’”67  This is
precisely the concept the parents were unwilling to accept.  Most of the children of
the families that objected to the assigned readings withdrew from the Hawkins County
schools to be homeschooled, attend religious schools, or enter a more congenial
school system.68
61 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
62 Fields v. Palmdale Sch. Dist., 427 F.3d 1197, 1206 (9th Cir. 2005), modified , 447 F.3d
1187, cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1089 (2006); Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist, 401 F.3d 381,
395–96 (6th Cir. 2005).
63 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988).
64 Id. at 1066.
65 Id. at 1068–69.
66 Id. at 1062.
67 Id. at 1068–69 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986)).
68 Id. at 1060.
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The Supreme Court subsequently restricted free exercise rights to accommodation
in Employment Division v. Smith, making it even less likely that parents with similar
claims might prevail.69  Smith held “that a law that is neutral and of general applicability
need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the
incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice.”70  This emerging narrow
view of how little the state must do to make the ultra-religious feel comfortable—
combined with restrictions on school prayer—may help to account for the stunning
growth in homeschooling that began in the 1990s.  Parents who understand that their
parental liberty is limited to the right to choose whether or not to send their children
to public schools may well conclude that the only way to control the environment in
which their children are educated is to remove them from public school, or to remove
them from organized schools entirely.
In obiter dicta in Smith, Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, suggested that a
“hybrid-rights” exception to the Smith doctrine may exist, in which a religious exercise
claim combined with another constitutional claim, expressly including “the right of
parents acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, . . . to direct the education of
their children” would require strict scrutiny of the state’s actions.71  Some religious
parents, who enroll their children in public school and then try to bend the schools to
their own value system, or who seek to exempt children from certain aspects of the
curriculum (such as sex education or evolution), believe that they meet the require-
ments for a hybrid claim under Smith, as do many homeschoolers.
Predictably, homeschooling parents who seek complete immunity from state over-
sight seized on the hybrid rights exception to Smith.72  No court to date, however, has
found for parents who made hybrid claims based on their liberty interests in parent-
ing and the Free Exercise Clause.  Indeed, a number of appellate courts reject the
doctrine entirely.73
69 Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
70 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993) (citing
Smith, 494 U.S. at 879).
71 Smith, 494 U.S. at 881–82 (citing and discussing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S.
510 (1925), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
72 Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 244 (2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct.
1013 (2009).
73 Some courts reject the concept altogether. The Second, Third and Sixth Circuits treat
the notion of hybrid claims as merely dicta. Combs, 540 F.3d at 247 (“Until the Supreme Court
provides direction, we believe the hybrid-rights theory to be dicta.”); Leebaert v. Harrington,
332 F.3d 134, 143 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding there is no right to exemption from sex education
class and “Smith’s ‘language relating to hybrid claims is dicta’”); Watchtower Bible and
Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Stratton, 240 F.3d 553, 561–62 (6th Cir. 2001), rev’d on other
grounds, 536 U.S, 150 (2002); Kissinger v. Bd. of Trustees of the Ohio State Univ., Coll. of
Veterinary Med., 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that the hybrid rights exception is
“completely illogical”).
Other courts are willing to entertain heightened scrutiny for hybrid claims, but only where
each claim is “tenable” on its own. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 98 & n.9 (1st Cir.) (parental
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III. THE NEEDS OF A PLURALIST DEMOCRACY TRUMP PARENTAL PREFERENCES
Two federal appellate courts have expressly rejected the hybrid rights claims
offered by homeschooling parents.  In Swanson v. Guthrie,74 the Tenth Circuit dis-
missed as not even “colorable” a claim by homeschoolers that they should be able
to supplement their religious homeschooling with selective use of public school
facilities by cherry-picking the courses and activities their daughter wanted to use.75 
The parents asserted that the school board’s requirement that students attend the
public schools full-time or not at all constituted an indirect burden on their free exer-
cise rights combined with their liberty interest in educating their children, resulting
in a hybrid claim under Smith that required strict scrutiny.76  The court expressly repu-
diated the parents’ attempt to distinguish Mozert: “We see no difference of consti-
tutional dimension between [opting-in to classes and opting-out of them].  The right
to direct one’s child’s education does not protect either alternative.”77
In Combs v. Homer-Center School District, a case that lies at the core of my argu-
ment here, the Third Circuit ruled against homeschooling parents who asserted that
compliance with the state’s reporting and regulatory review requirements for home
rights claim of entitlement to advance notice and right to exemption from elementary school
book readings is not even “colorable” much less “ independently viable”), cert. denied, 129
S. Ct. 56 (2008); Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 18–19 (1st Cir.) (affirming
rejection of a hybrid Parents’ Rights/Free Exercise claim as not independently viable), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 988 (2004); Henderson v. Kennedy, 253 F.3d 12, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (finding
no hybrid claim), cert. denied sub nom. Henderson v. Mainella, 535 U.S. 986 (2002); EEOC
v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (finding a hybrid claim where Free
Exercise is combined with an Establishment Clause claim); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer
Prod., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding no independently viable parental rights
claim controlled the public school curriculum), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1159 (1996).
While the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have recognized hybrid rights, they require plaintiffs
to raise “colorable” claims. San Jose Christian Coll. v. Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1032
(9th Cir. 2004); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1296–97 (10th Cir. 2004). The Tenth
Circuit expressly repudiated enforceable parental rights in the context of hybrid claims made
by homeschoolers: A plaintiff cannot “simply invoke the parental rights doctrine, combine
it with a claimed free-exercise right, and thereby force a government to demonstrate the pres-
ence of a compelling state interest.” Swanson v. Guthrie Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 1-L, 135 F.3d
694, 700 (10th Cir. 1998) (rejecting a claim that homeschooled children should be able to
opt-in to public schools for specific classes).
74 Swanson, 135 F.3d 694.
75 Id. at 696, 700 (discussing request to attend foreign language, music and certain science
courses).
76 Id. at 699.
77 Id. at 700. One might argue that the school board’s interests would be better served by
enticing homeschooled students to join their peers at least on a part-time basis, but that is left
to the board’s discretion as a matter of constitutional law, as is the decision whether or not
to accommodate parental requests for exemptions from the regular curriculum.
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schools violated their religious beliefs.78  The six families, all Christians of different
denominations, shared the common belief that education of their children was more
than a religious duty—according to them, education was religion itself.79  This view-
point is consistent with “the cultural strand within conservative Protestantism” that
views “all aspects of life, including teaching and learning [as] inherently religious.”80
Tackling the parents’ hybrid claim, the Combs court concluded that neither
Meyer, nor Pierce, nor Yoder supported parental rights as framed in the case.81  The
“particular right asserted in this case—the right to be free from all reporting require-
ments and ‘discretionary’ state oversight of a child’s home-school education—has
never been recognized.”82  The state’s reporting requirements did not limit or interfere
with the limited parental right to choose the means of complying with the compulsory
education law by selecting a mode of schooling.83  Pierce and Meyer and “‘a sub-
stantial body of case law’” recognized that if the state must allow parents to choose
alternatives to public school “‘it has a proper interest in the manner in which those
schools perform their secular education function.’”84  Finding no colorable parental
rights claim, the court expressly held that “[e]ven if we were to apply” the more gen-
erous pleading approach of other circuits to hybrid claims (which the Third Circuit
does not recognize), the parents in Combs had failed to offer an independent parental
rights claim.85  In the absence of any allegations that the state regulation had directly
interfered with the parents’ religious teachings, no viable claim existed.
Similarly, in Jonathan L. v. Superior Court86 a California appellate court held
that there is no constitutional right to homeschool, even when motivated by religious
beliefs.87  In short, the court held, “no such absolute right to home school exists.”88 
The parents’ preferences “must yield to state interests in certain circumstances.”89 
Without deciding whether it would consider the parents’ hybrid rights claim, or what
standard of scrutiny was required, the court concluded that the state had a compelling
78 Combs v. Homer-Center Sch. Dist., 540 F.3d 231, 233 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming sum-
mary judgment to the state officials below under federal law, but remanding claims based on
the state’s Religious Freedom Restoration Act, later transferred to state court), cert. denied,
129 S. Ct. 1013 (2009).
79 Id. at 234.
80 Sikkink, supra note 27, at 280.
81 Combs, 540 F.3d at 247–49, 252.
82 Id. at 247.
83 Id. at 251.
84 Id. at 249 n.26 (quoting Bd. of Educ. of Cent. Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236,
245–47 (1968) (upholding law providing public purchase and loan of textbooks to sectarian
schools)).
85 Id. at 247.
86 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
87 Id. at 592.
88 Id.
89 Id.
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interest in requiring the child, Rachel, to attend public school because of allegations
of physical and sexual abuse that put her health and safety at risk.90  In the context of
a dependency proceeding, in which reports of abuse began in 1987, and another child
in the family had already been adjudicated dependent and removed from the family,
the court concluded, “[t]o pose the question is to answer it.”91  The state had a com-
pelling interest, if one were required, in demanding that Rachel attend a public school
where she would have regular contact with mandated child abuse reporters.92
But the court did not limit its discussion to dependency proceedings.  Seventeen-
year-old Rachel L. told authorities she wanted to attend public school.93  Social workers
had concluded that keeping her at home where her mother, who lacked a high school
diploma, taught eight children, and where Rachel was expected to help her younger
siblings learn, exposed her to risk of “serious emotional damage.”94  More broadly,
the court noted the state’s responsibility for ensuring that all of the children in the state
receive the “‘chance[ ] for economic and social success’” that education offers, and
recognized the “social dimension to the state’s interest in education.”95  The “social
dimension,” the court continued, involves schools bringing “‘together members of
different racial and cultural groups and, hopefully, help them to live together in har-
mony and mutual respect . . . [t]hese results are directly linked to the constitutional
role of education in preserving democracy . . . .’”96
What the California court called the “social dimension” is more commonly iden-
tified as the “shared experiences and common values” that provide societal cohe-
sion.97  Schools have long been charged with transmitting those shared values to the
young, to say that schools transmit our values to the next generation of citizens is only
to begin the conversation.  What values are we—as a nation—committed to inculcat-
ing in our children?  Because schools play a central role in democracy, it is incumbent
upon us to agree at a minimum on some shared goals for education suitable to a
modern democracy.
Aristotle posits the unnamed virtue of “acting well toward fellow citizens and
strangers.”98  This is not the norm of hospitality, but a more demanding notion of
engagement—neither domineering nor obsequious that allows us to confront and
resolve our differences.  In modern democracies some ways of acting well toward
90 Id. at 593–94.
91 Id. at 578, 593.
92 Id. at 593.
93 Id. at 579. By the time the matter reached the appellate court, Rachel had run away and
could not be located. Id. at 580 n.11.
94 Id. at 579.
95 Id. at 582 (quoting Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 605 (1971)).
96 Id. (quoting Hartzell v. Connell, 679 P.2d 35, 41 (Cal. 1984) (internal citations omitted)).
97 Reich, supra note 30, at 58 (citing CASS SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM 2001).
98 ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 108 (Terence Irwin trans., 1985); Danielle S. Allen,
Further Reflections on Little Rock, in 4 SCHOOLS: STUDIES IN EDUCATION 13, 14 (2007).
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others are enshrined in law.  The First Amendment requires, among other things and
generally speaking, that the government shall not inhibit speech, shall leave indi-
viduals free to practice any religion or none, and shall not establish or prefer any set
of religious beliefs.99
Normative values are implicit in these civil liberties.100  The First Amendment
does not bind individuals (or any private actors), but it states a value preference. 
Respect for difference is at the heart of the First Amendment.101  We should both
speak and listen.  We should respect the choices others make about their beliefs and
practices even if we disagree.
Political theorist Amy Gutmann proposes three basic principles that should form
the core of “any morally defensible democracy”: civic equality, liberty, and opportu-
nity.102  In the United States, the core value of tolerance serves all three goals.
Many liberal political theorists argue, however, that there are limits to tolerance.103 
In order for the norm of tolerance to survive across generations, society need not and
should not tolerate the inculcation of absolutist views that undermine toleration of
difference.104  Respect for difference should not be confused with approval for ap-
proaches that would splinter us into countless warring groups.  Hence an argument that
tolerance for diverse views and values is a foundational principle does not conflict with
the notion that the state can and should limit the ability of intolerant homeschoolers
to inculcate hostility to difference in their children—at least during the portion of the
day they claim to devote to satisfying the compulsory schooling requirement.
A. What Should the State Do?
The problem I have identified does not necessarily exist in all homeschooling
environments.  Just as conservative Christians are not monolithic—they choose dif-
ferent forms of schooling for their children—neither do all homeschoolers share the
same agenda.  Some homeschoolers may want their children to learn about all sorts
of belief systems.  But the evidence strongly indicates that many parents choose
99 U.S. CONST. amend I.
100 I examine this theme in greater depth, as well as the role of the First Amendment, in my
forthcoming book. CATHERINE J. ROSS, THE TROUBLED FIRST AMENDMENT IN OUR PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (Harvard University Press forthcoming) (on file with author).
101 Amy Gutmann, Civic Education and Social Diversity, 105 ETHICS 557, 562 (1993),
discusses the divide between political liberals and comprehensive liberals over whether
teaching ideals of individualism and autonomy ought to be part of the public agenda. But
both, she argues, support teaching tolerance and mutual respect.
102 AMY GUTMANN, IDENTITY IN DEMOCRACY 5 (2003).
103 Gutmann, supra note 101, at 562–63.
104 Id.; see also MACEDO, supra note 28, at 85; Michael Walzer, Comment, in MULTI-
CULURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 99–101 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994)
(noting that immigrant societies like the U.S. are committed above all to individual rights and
neutrality concerning culture and religion).
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homeschooling precisely to avoid having their children exposed to other beliefs, or
to what they disparagingly view as “relativism.”105  Homeschooling parents who sub-
scribe to an absolutist belief system are at the base of many legal disputes that arise
in schools.106  They often insist on a closed system of communication—objecting to
their children’s hearing or reading about discordant ideas or beliefs.  If a parent sub-
scribes to an absolutist belief system premised on the notion that it was handed down
by a creator, that it (like the Ten Commandments) is etched in stone and that all other
systems are wrong, the essential lessons of a civic education (i.e., tolerance and mutual
respect) often seem deeply challenging and suspect.  If the core principle in a parent’s
belief system is that there is only one immutable truth that cannot be questioned, many
educational topics will be off limits.107  Such “private truths” have no place in the
public arena, including the public schools.108
When the children of parents who hold absolutist beliefs of this sort attend
public school, we hope that they will learn about the civic norms at the heart of the
First Amendment.  This is unfortunately one of the main reasons their parents remove
them from public school.  If children hear the message of tolerance in school, they
may disagree with the teacher; they may have arguments about it in the cafeteria. 
Parents of public school students have ample time to counteract and undermine
lessons the children have learned in school that conflict with family values.  The
children are free to accept or reject the views of their parents on the subject.  This
is part of the balance between family and state that distinguishes our republic from
totalitarian regimes such as Plato’s Republic and ancient Sparta, as the Court put it
in Meyer.109
But when parents withdraw their children entirely from the public sphere, children
are sheltered from any countervailing messages.  Civic messages serve shared social
goals and also allow children to choose their own identities as they mature,110 a step
that many parents find threatening no matter what world view they subscribe to, but
105 See Eric A. DeGroff, Parental Rights and Public School Criteria: Revisiting Mozert
After 20 Years, 38 J.L. & EDUC. 83, 86–87 & n.32 (2009).
106 See, e.g., Altman v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49 (2d Cir.) (describing parents’
challenges to school activities, arguing that they violated plaintiff children’s First Amendment
rights), cert. denied sub nom. Dibari v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 534 U.S. 827 (2001);
Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (allowing children
of parents who objected to content of grade school readers on religious grounds to be taught
at home while the parents’ suit against the school board was pending), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1066 (1988).
107 This may be true even of highly-educated, sophisticated parents, including law pro-
fessors. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 178–81 (1993).
108 RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 36 (1984); see GUTMANN, supra note 102, at 156.
109 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401–02 (1923).
110 See Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive Information,
2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 224 (1999).
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which traditionalist religious parents are apt to find even more frightening because
they sincerely believe that erring children will burn in hell.
Some of these concerns apply to organized schools as well.  For example, some
data indicate that students in evangelical schools demonstrate less comfort with free-
dom of speech than their peers in public schools.111  Organized schools, however, all
submit to state licensing procedures which include periodic oversight visits in most
or all states.112  Unlike home schools, sectarian schools offer some transparency, and
I am unaware of any that have challenged the state’s authority to impose minimum
curricular requirements in recent years.113
Consistent with Gutmann’s assertion that “[a] democratic government cannot
possibly accommodate all conscientious beliefs, whatever they happen to be, and
still remain democratic let alone committed to pursuing democratic justice,”114 state
officials may revoke the accreditation of fundamentalist schools that offer an extreme
curriculum.115  For example, if a radical madrassa taught its students to challenge the
authority of the United States and urged students to grow up to be suicide bombers,
the state could remove it from the list of institutions through which students could
satisfy the compulsory schooling requirements.116  This decision would not, in my
111 Sikkink, supra note 27, at 278.
112 For a comprehensive guide to state regulations of private schools, see OFFICE OF NON-
PUB. EDUC., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATE REGULATION OF PRIVATE SCHOOLS (2009), avail-
able at http://www2.ed.gov/admins/comm/choice/regprivschl/regprivschl.pdf.
113 In the 1980s, several lower courts rebuffed challenges to the states’ regulatory authority
over schools. See, e.g., Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F.2d 1039, 1044 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding
standardized testing requirement for homeschooled children); Fellowship Baptist Church v.
Benton, 815 F.2d 485 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding state oversight and regulation of sectarian
schools).
An argument has been made that some state Religious Freedom Restoration Act statutes
protect sectarian schools and home schools from state oversight. The plaintiffs in Combs made
this claim about the Pennsylvania law, and that claim was recently remanded from federal to
state court as a question of first impression under state law. Combs v. Homer-Cent. Sch. Dist.,
No. 04cv1599 LEAD, slip op., 2009 WL 2849947, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 2, 2009) (dismissing
all federal claims on remand from the Third Circuit and declining to exercise jurisdiction over
the remaining state claim). I have not examined claims homeschoolers might make or have
made under state RFRAs.
114  GUTMANN, supra note 102, at 170.
115 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (noting there is no question as to the
rights of the state to supervise and inspect teachers and pupils and to ensure nothing taught
“is manifestly inimical to the public welfare”).
116 A private school operated by the Saudi government in Alexandria, Virginia, has been
the subject of extended controversy concerning the messages contained in its Arabic textbooks.
A review of seventeen books by the U.S. Commission on International Freedom recommended
that the county government close the school after finding statements in the texts including an
interpretation of the Quran indicating that it was permissible to kill adulterers and persons who
convert from Islam to other religions, accusations that Jews caused the split between Sunni
and Shiite Muslims, and that Muslims can seize the life and property of “polytheists,” including
those who believe in all of the world’s other major religions. Matthew Barakat, N. Va. School’s
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view, compromise the rights of the teachers or the parents to continue to voice their
opinions outside the temporal space reserved for compulsory schooling, as long as
they did not violate any criminal statutes, including those governing incitement. 
States recognize that enrollment in licensed independent schools satisfies the com-
pulsory education laws in part because they may conclude that “institutional private
schools are under the direct supervision of . . . school authorities at all times.”117  In
contrast, it is exceedingly difficult for the state to supervise numerous “widely
scattered” parents who provide instruction at varying levels in their homes.118
Since states can impose minimum curricular requirements on home schools, and
test students to be sure that they receive the mandated education, it should also be
possible for states to require homeschoolers to meet broader curricular goals.  Other
commentators have urged states to engage in greater regulation of homeschooling
to promote quality education119 and to protect the rights of homeschooled children,
including the right of gender equality120 and self-determination.121
I propose that we add to the civics education goals of the state, including lessons
on mutual respect for diverse populations and viewpoints as a mandatory curricular
requirements.  As I observed above, some homeschoolers doubtless are committed
to diversity, and this requirement would not conflict with their educational agenda,
but this is not the group that concerns me.  Imposing curricular requirements about
respect for diverse viewpoints will be seen as undermining the most authoritarian con-
servative homeschoolers—those who believe in an absolute truth which forms the
basis of the education they provide their children.  Unfortunately, the unavoidable
counterpart of a belief in absolute truth is that other belief systems are mistaken at
best, and at worst, evil.
School integration provides an excellent analogy for the courts overriding parental
educational choices, including those based on religious beliefs, when those choices
conflict with constitutional imperatives.  In 1973, a state court in Florida expressly
Texts Found to OK Killing, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 12, 2008, at B7. The Saudi
government subsequently agreed to revise the readings, after alleging that the texts had been
misinterpreted and mistranslated, and it has deleted some of the passages the Commission had
flagged. The school’s status was under review by the Southern Association of Colleges and
Schools, the applicable accreditation body, as of 2009. Matthew Barakat, Saudi Academy in
Va. Revises Islamic History Books, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 12, 2009, available at http://seattle
times.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2008846126_apsaudiacademy.html.
117 Scoma v. Chi. Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452, 462 (N.D. Ill. 1974).
118 Id.
119 See Yuracko, supra note 1, at 133.
120 Id. at 156–58 and passim. See generally Linda C. McClain, The Domain of Civic Virtue
in a Good Society: Families, Schools, and Sex Equality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1617 (2001).
121 Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between
Parent and State, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1286 (2000) (considering possibility of mandatory
public school attendance during late adolescence); Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental
Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 27, 54 (urging “develop-
mental non-influence”).
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considered and rejected assertions that one family’s religiously-based belief in racial
segregation entitled it to an exemption from the state’s compulsory school law that
would allow parents to teach their children at home in a school they called the Ida
M. Craig Christian Day School, whose sole teacher was the mother and whose only
students were the children in the family.122  According to the parents, “race mixing as
practiced in the public schools was sinful and contrary to their religious beliefs.”123 
In the face of the parents’ assertion that they believed “blacks and Orientals were con-
ceived through the copulation of Eve and Satan,”124 the court ordered them to send
their children to the integrated local public school.125  If local authorities learned that
these parents were homeschooling today, there should not be any legal bar to requiring
their children to enroll in a licensed, organized school.
Parents with such racist beliefs could not expressly evade the national commit-
ment to integration by using organized schools either.  In Runyon v. McCrary, the
Supreme Court dealt a major blow to the Christian academies that had been estab-
lished to circumvent school integration, when it held that private schools could not
deny admission on the basis of race.126  The Court rejected the parents’ claims that
their right to direct their children’s education included the right to send them to racially
segregated schools, observing that even if one assumes that parents have the First
Amendment right to “send their children to educational institutions that promote the
belief that racial segregation is desirable,” the contractual actions of the schools them-
selves are limited by law; they cannot refuse admission to nonwhites.127
As the Court explained in another case about parental racism, “[t]he Constitution
cannot control such [private] prejudices but neither can it tolerate them.  Private biases
may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give
them effect.”128
Whatever rights or privileges homeschoolers may have in the various states,
nothing in federal law prevents closer regulation, including more detailed curricular
demands.  Meyer and Pierce, on which homeschoolers rely more heavily than the
cases warrant, were premised on the uncontested principle that the state has the power
to establish and enforce standard curricula that reach private schools.  Neither Combs
nor Jonathan L. suggests that the Federal Constitution limits the ability of states to
regulate home schools more closely.  Indeed, the Jonathan L. court expressly chas-
tised the California legislature for failing to provide for any oversight of home schools
other than requiring that parents filed an affidavit stating that they have made other
arrangements and will not be enrolling their children in public school.129  The court’s
122 T.A.F. v. Duval County, 273 So. 2d 15, 17–18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
123 Id. at 16. At the time, Florida did not permit homeschooling.
124 Id. at 18.
125 Id.
126 427 U.S. 160, 173–74 (1976).
127 Id. at 176 (emphasis added).
128 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
129 Jonathan L. v. Super. Ct., 81 Cal. Rptr. 3d 571, 595–96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
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lengthy footnotes summarize methods used by other states to ensure that their home-
schooled children are receiving an adequate education.130
Public schools at their best offer alternative views of the world that are essential
to our constitutional system.  As Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court about our
schools, explained: “The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude
of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection.’”131  Those words
are as true today as when he wrote them.
IV. A PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR OF FORMAL SCHOOLING WHEN PARENTS
DISAGREE
So far I have directed my comments to the extent of the states’ power to man-
date exposure to diverse views in homeschool curricula where both parents in a
family are united in choosing to homeschool their children.  Now I turn to the
question of whether the state should be neutral about the choice between
homeschooling and education in a public or private school licensed by the state
when the parents cannot agree.  Parental conflict over the choice of school is
unlikely to come to public attention in an intact family, nor is there a mechanism for
the state to intervene in such disputes absent harm to the child.  But when parents
do not live together and share legal custody of children, disputes over educational
choice frequently end up in family court.
When parents share joint legal custody, each of them has a constitutional liberty
interest in the “care, custody and control” of their children that entitles them to make
educational decisions, including which school the child should attend.132  A judge
may be forced to resolve the issue.  When parents whose rights are equal cannot
reach a consensus, the standard for the court is the “best interests of the child,”
regardless of whether the dispute arises at an initial custody determination or at a
later hearing to enforce or modify a custody decree.133  This standard leaves the
judge enormous discretion.
130 Id. at 595–96 & nn.36–41 (summarizing regulations from other states including review
of instruction plans, achievement tests, annual assessments, and minimum qualifications for
teachers).
131 Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (internal
citation omitted).
132 Each parent also has the right to inculcate his or her religion during their parenting time
as well as to share their world views—no matter how controversial—more generally with the
child. Eugene Volokh treats these parental rights as speech rights. Eugene Volokh, Parent-
Child Speech and Child Custody Speech Restrictions, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 673 (2006)
(“In practice, the law almost never restricts parental speech in intact families.”).
133 The unilateral decision by one parent to begin homeschooling is a substantial change
in circumstances warranting consideration of modification of a custody decree. In re Marriage
of Riess, 632 N.E.2d 635, 640 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994).
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State courts have not offered definitive guidance on whether the state should be
neutral where one parent seeks to homeschool but another parent, who shares legal
custody, disagrees.  In the few private disputes that posed the issue, courts have re-
tained the fact-specific best interests approach in which there is no way to factor in
the state’s interest in education.
In a case of first impression, an appellate court in Pennsylvania declined in 2008
to adopt a rule or presumption to govern such cases, rejecting the father’s argument
that the courts should favor public schooling when parents disagree.134  Instead, apply-
ing the “well-established best interests standard, applied on a case by case basis,” the
court ruled that in the matter before it—where the homeschooled children were doing
well academically, where the school district supervised the education, and where the
father had agreed to the homeschooling plan before the parents divorced—the trial
court had not abused its discretion in ordering continuation of the homeschooling
regime.135  Two other factors were crucial.  Although the homeschooling mother had
only a high school degree, the father had not shown that the children’s best interest
would be better served in public school.136  Instead, his arguments focused on his own
interests as the parent who objected to homeschooling.137
Because the state is not a party to domestic custody proceedings, no argument was
made that social policy or the state’s interest in promoting exposure to diverse views
and inculcating tolerance tilted toward a preference for public schooling.  The court
nonetheless considered and rejected the argument, based on the legislative history of
the state’s 1988 statute authorizing home education programs.138  The court expressly
reversed the trial court’s conclusion that “absent extraordinary circumstances . . . it
is usually in the child’s best interests to attend public school.”139
Similarly, a family court in New Hampshire applied the best interests standard to
an ongoing dispute between parents who had been divorced for ten years over whether
their ten-year-old daughter, Amanda, should continue to be homeschooled by her
mother or enrolled in public school as her father preferred.140  The father did not object
to the content of the homeschooling curriculum which included Bible lessons.  He
134 Staub v. Staub, 960 A.2d 848, 849 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
135 Id. at 849–50, 855–56.
136 Id. at 855–56.
137 Id. at 852.
138 Id.
139 Id. at 853; see also Jordan v. Rea, 212 P.3d 919, 922 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (holding
that best interests apply to parental disputes over private religious school); Donna G.R. v.
James B.R., 877 So.2d 1164, 1167, 1170–71 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (reversing order continuing
homeschooling as abuse of discretion where homeschooling mother left school at age 15 and
children did poorly on standardized tests revealing “substandard” work); Taylor v. Taylor,
758 N.W.2d 243 (Mich. 2008) (denying application for leave to appeal trial court’s order that
child attend public school despite the appearance of bias against homeschooling).
140 In re Kurowski & Voydatch, No. 2006-M-669, 2–3 (Laconia Fam. Div. N.H. July, 14,
2009), available at http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/KurowskiOrder.pdf.
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pitched in by teaching Amanda during his parenting time but worried about her lack
of opportunities to be with her peers.141  The father argued that public schooling would
expose Amanda to viewpoints other than her mother’s “rigid” religion, and enable her
“to function in a world which requires some element of independent thinking and
tolerance for different points of view.”142
In a sign of how unsuited Amanda had become to entertaining other viewpoints,
even those held by the people she loved most, the Guardian ad Litem reported that
Amanda’s adoption of her mother’s religious belief system interfered with her rela-
tionship with her father.143  Amanda was upset that her father did not share her reli-
gious beliefs and had chosen “to spend eternity away from her” a decision that, to her,
proved that he did “not love her as much as he sa[id] he d[id].”144  The court ordered
that Amanda attend public school where, among other things, she would benefit from
increased “exposure to a variety of points of view.”145
Asserting that she was not basing her decision on Amanda’s religious beliefs, the
judge “considered only the impact of those beliefs on her interactions with others.”146 
Without acknowledging it, the judge appeared to show a preference for public school
over homeschooling—at least over homeschooling with fundamentalist parents. 
Would not most children benefit from exposure to diverse views?  Framed in this way,
the judge may well be viewed as undermining the mother’s religious exercise rights
with respect to her daughter.  On the other hand, the mother’s views were undermining
the father’s relationship with Amanda who concluded that if her father really loved
her, he would become born again.147  There was no clear way to resolve this domestic
conflict between two parents whose religious and parental rights were in equipoise.
A better—and perhaps more forthcoming–approach would be to adopt a rebut-
table presumption that, all other things being equal, where the parents disagree, the
state prefers public school to homeschooling because public schools serve the state’s
interest in exposure to diverse viewpoints and people.  This would achieve the same
result without necessitating any commentary on the religious views of Amanda or her
mother.  The preference could develop through common law or, perhaps preferably,
through statutory language indicating the state’s preference for public schooling, or
at least for attendance at a formally licensed school, as compared to its tolerance for
homeschooling.  Such legislative language would be consistent with and promote the
state’s interest in providing all children with the lessons “essential to good citizen-
ship.”148  A preference for public schools over homeschooling when parents cannot
141 Id. at 3.
142 Id. at 5.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 7.
146 Id. at 8.
147 Id. at 5.
148 Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (“[C]ertain studies plainly essential
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agree would have the added advantage of precluding an “opening [of] the floodgates
for uncountable and never-ending post-divorce challenges”149 regarding this set of
educational decisions.
CONCLUSION
As I have argued, democracy relies on citizens who share core values, including
tolerance for diversity.  When parents reject these values, the state’s best opportunity
to introduce them lies in formal education.  Setting aside all of the other issues sur-
rounding homeschooling, the importance of inculcating democratic values is sufficient
reason for more rigorous regulation of homeschooling than prevails at present.  What-
ever the precise parameters of parental liberty ultimately prove to be under the U.S.
Constitution, they neither protect the right of parents to homeschool without oversight
nor outweigh the state’s interest in the appropriate education of youth for citizenship.
I have argued here for two major reforms: stronger curricular requirements aimed
at teaching constitutional values and statutes or common law favoring organized
schooling where parents are unable to agree on homeschooling.
First, states should require homeschoolers to include curricular materials that
promote tolerance for diversity.  Concededly, many fundamentalist and evangelical
homeschoolers may circumvent the requirement or undermine the materials even as
they assign them—precisely because they may chose to homeschool in order to avoid
messages of tolerance and to promote messages of truth.  The state should engage
in curricular oversight and testing, and should be prepared to withdraw consent to
homeschooling where families flagrantly violate this requirement.  I recognize, of
course, that the goal of requiring homeschoolers to teach lessons about tolerance is
largely hortatory, and may even be illusory.  Perhaps the most we could hope for is
lip service by homeschooled students on a standardized exam.  But if states were to
establish curricular requirements for teaching the meaning of the First Amendment,
homeschooled students would at least gain passing exposure to mainstream norms
of tolerance.
Second, where parents involved in custody disputes disagree about the choice of
school for their children, states should adopt a rebuttable presumption favoring licensed
schools (whether public or private) over homeschooling.  Such a public policy would
send a strong message even to intact families in which parents are divided over the
choice of school environment, and would provide a layer of educational protection for
children whose parents do not live together.  This presumptive preference would serve
additional aims such as gender equity, preparation to live and work in a non-insular
world, and contact with mandated child abuse reporters and other social service
to good citizenship must be taught . . . .”).
149 Stephen v. Stephen, 937 P.2d 92, 100 (Okla. 1997) (Simms, J., concurring).
1014 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 18:991
providers.  Above all, favoring licensed schools over homeschooling promotes the
state’s normative goals in exposing children to constitutional values.
